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Introduction
Developing small and micro states -defined by the UN as, respectively, countries with less than 1.5 and less than one million inhabitants -face severe disadvantages in dealing with the rest of the world because of low bargaining power and limited financial and human resources available for the various international negotiations they are engaged in. By forming a regional cooperation agreement and negotiating as a bloc, small and microstates would benefit from greater bargaining power and lower international negotiation costs. As the world has become more integrated, the number of issues to be dealt with in the international arena has grown and so has the importance of regional cooperation between these states. 1 Regional blocs often arise within a geographic region because member countries typically exhibit greater similarity of interests than more distant countries. The reason is that they tend to produce and export similar products, and negotiate about similar issues with the same regional and/or global powers and institutions. A number of regional blocs with small and micro member states located in relative proximity to each other have arisen over time. These include: i) the fifteen-member Caribbean Community or CARICOM (twelve microstates, one small state and two larger countries, Haiti and Jamaica); ii) the twelve-member Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement or PICTA (eleven microstates and a larger country, Papua New Guinea); and iii) the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council or GCC (two microstates and four larger ones).
Though countries such as Jamaica and Haiti in CARICOM, and Papua New Guinea in PICTA, are not small in terms of the UN definition, they are small in comparison to developed countries and regions such as the US, EU and Japan in terms of population and, even more so, in terms of their GDP. Hence, the former's influence in international negotiations with the latter is likely to be very limited.
2 Byron (1994) and IADB (1995) have argued that the fifteen Caribbean members of CARICOM pooled their negotiation resources and formulated common policy stances in negotiations with larger countries, trade blocs and international organizations. 3 Specifically, 1 Small states should also benefit from membership in a regional bloc because of enhanced visibility and more international agreements due to lower foreign entities' costs of negotiating with a regional bloc than with each small member state separately. 2 This does not necessarily hold for the GCC whose share of the world oil market is large, though it has declined over time. 3 The members of CARICOM notified the GATT/WTO on formation of a regional trade agreement on goods in 1974 Though members of a regional bloc may benefit from sharing international negotiation costs, reaching a common position on every issue to be negotiated with foreign entities results in additional costs. The process leading to a common position could be cumbersome and costly, especially if the group size is large and initial positions differ significantly. On the other hand, greater similarity among member states would reduce the cost of reaching a joint policy stance. 4 As in many regional agreements, accession to CARICOM was sequential. 3
International migration could make a significant contribution in this context by raising the likelihood that such regional cooperation bloc takes place and by raising the benefit obtained from it. This is likely to be particularly important -and the welfare impact particularly large -in cases where the heterogeneity in the endowments of the bloc's member states is large.
Though an important international trade literature on South-North migration and on its impact in host and home countries exists, this is not the case for South-South migration. The classic trade and factor movement studies are Mundell (1957) and Markusen (1983 A number of studies have revealed other important determinants of international (and internal) migration, including migrant networks (e.g., Beine et al. 2009 ) and individual, household, and community characteristics (e.g., Mora and Taylor, 2006 , whose analysis of Mexico's internal, international and inter-sectoral migration also accounts for the impact of networks). That migration and migrant networks result in increased trade between host and source countries was found by Gould (1994), Rauch (2001) and Rauch and Trindade (2002) , and result in increased investment from host to source countries was shown by Javorcik et al.
(forthcoming) and Kugler and Rapoport (2007) .
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This paper provides a different motive for migration. South-South migration is undertaken in order to increase the benefits obtained from regional bloc formation by a region's small states. Moreover, as is shown in Section 3, the decision on the level of South-South migration and on the states between which migration takes place is made by the bloc's member states while, as shown in Section 5, the decision to undertake South-North migration is made by the individuals themselves.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a general equilibrium model where the formation of a regional cooperation bloc among small states and its welfare implications re examined under various accession rules. Section 3 incorporates SouthSouth migration into the model and Section 4 examines the relationship between migration and trade and shows that it varies with the objective of the negotiations and the nature of the benefits.
Section 5 incorporates South-North migration in the analysis and Section 6 concludes.
Model
This section presents, in Subsection 2.1, a general equilibrium framework in order to examine the formation of a regional cooperative arrangement or regional bloc between some of the region's small states. Subsections 2.2 and 2.3 examine the bloc's equilibrium size and welfare impact under two different rules regarding small states' accession to the regional bloc. This section abstracts from international migration, which is taken up in Section 3.
Bloc Formation in a General Equilibrium Framework
Assume a Heckscher-Ohlin model for a region with a uniform distribution of small labor-
using capital and labor to produce a labor-intensive exportable (X) and a capital-intensive importable (Y). Prices, which are normalized to one
), are given to each small state and to the region as a whole, and thus so are the normalized factor prices w = r = 1.
The region's small states form a regional bloc if cooperation between its members raises the benefits obtained from international negotiations. The number of foreign entities with which each state negotiates is denoted by m. Internal solutions are assumed throughout unless stipulated otherwise. Each bloc member's per-issue payoff or "revenue" R from collective action is
( 1) That R(n) is an increasing function of bloc size n reflects the fact that a bloc's bargaining power in international negotiations increases with its size. The latter is particularly important for small states whose individual bargaining power is minimal. The concavity assumption is based on the conjecture that the increase in bargaining power associated with a given expansion in a regional bloc is more important when the group is small than when it is large, though R could be convex as long as the net payoff or benefit B is concave (see equation (5)).
Negotiation costs are of two types, international costs and regional costs. A small state negotiating individually incurs a per-issue international negotiation cost x. The per-issue international negotiation cost incurred by each member of an n-country regional bloc is
Bloc members also incur a per-issue regional cost
of reaching a common policy stance, where parameter α --considered exogenous in this section and endogenous in Section 3 --is a measure of the dissimilarity in member states' endowments and hence in their positions on the m issues. This cost is given by
The regional cost R C increases with α at an increasing rate, implying that a degree of dissimilarity exists beyond which it is more beneficial to negotiate individually than as part of a regional bloc, in which case no such bloc is formed. The same result holds for bloc size n, with R C increasing at an increasing rate with n. On the other hand, R C decreases at a decreasing rate with the number of issues m being negotiated, i.e., the negative impact of m on R C due to scale and scope economies diminishes with m.
The total per-issue negotiation cost is the sum of the international and regional costs, i.e.:
7 An example is
The average per-issue benefit B is the difference between the bloc's payoff R and the sum of the international and regional negotiation costs, i.e.:
. This is shown in Figure 1 where B is represented by curve AB. The benefit of negotiating individually is
, which is assumed positive (see Figure 1) . The likelihood that the maximum value of B is greater than 1 B , and thus that a regional bloc is formed, increases with bloc members' similarity (i.e., with lower regional negotiation costs), with the level of international negotiation costs and with the number of issues being negotiated.
A bloc's equilibrium size depends on the accession rule. Two such rules are examined.
The first one, presented in Section 2.2, assumes member states do not charge an accession fee.
The second one, presented in Section 2.3, assumes they charge an accession fee if it is optimal to do so. The first case serves in part as a benchmark against which the second case is compared.
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Note that major elements of the general equilibrium model, namely the region's production, consumption and trade of the two goods, cannot be determined at this stage. The object of the international negotiations must first be specified before these variables can be solved for and the model closed. This is done in Section 4.
No Accession Fee
Denote the maximum value of average benefit ) , , , ( 
). The E n members of the bloc are drawn randomly from the small states in the region, with a probability 1 < E n of being selected. The solution is represented by point B in Figure 1 . In the absence of accession fees, new member states obtain the same benefit B as existing members and accession by an additional state generates a positive (negative) externality for n < (>) E n by raising (reducing) the value of B . Thus, as long as n < E n , member states have an incentive to allow new states to join.
7 However, they have no incentive to expand the bloc beyond size E n since B falls for n > E n .
Thus, E n is the equilibrium size under this accession rule.
The per-issue value of the regional bloc is
and is represented by area EFLK in Figure 1 . The impact of changes in α , x and m on E n is obtained by differentiating the
. Thus, we have:
Thus, the bloc size E n that maximizes the member states' average benefit falls with the degree of dissimilarity between them (i.e., it falls with regional negotiation costs) and increases with international negotiation costs and with the number of issues being negotiated.
Accession Fee
Denote the equilibrium bloc size in this case by 1
, which is the bloc size where the value of the bloc for the E n members reaches a maximum 
, which, together with equations (1) to (3), implies:
Thus, bloc size * n falls with member states' dissimilarity (i.e., with regional negotiation costs) and increases with international negotiation costs and with the number of issues negotiated. non-members. As is well known, welfare is maximized when the marginal (social) value of a resource is equalized across all its alternative uses, which in this case means that the value of the regional bloc is maximized when the marginal social value is the same for the three groups of small states.
In the case of a common property resource, a "tragedy of the commons" results when the average rather than the marginal social value of the resource employed is equated in all its uses.
This obtains under free entry into the regional bloc, i.e., under open access to the common property resource, in which case the average benefit
is identical for all the region's small states and the value of the regional bloc is entirely dissipated. This situation is represented by point D in Figure 1 , with migration level equal to F n .
The main results obtained in this section are collected in the following proposition. 
South-South Migration
Assume the dissimilarity in small states' positions on the issues that are negotiated internationally is a function of the dissimilarity in their relative endowment of labor and capital
The question examined here is whether migration between the region's small states can reduce their regional negotiation cost and contribute to the benefit obtained from engaging in international negotiations as a bloc. Assume, without loss of generality, that K is constant at level K = 1. Then, i l simplifies
assumed to have a uniform distribution. The total amount of migration in the bloc is M . For simplicity, it is assumed that 1 ≥ M . The benefit from migration increases with the degree of dissimilarity α between the region's small states, their geographic proximity (i.e., lower migration cost), number of issues m being negotiated, and with a reduction in international migration costs x.
Maximizing benefits with respect to α takes place in two steps. Before migration takes place, small states maximize their benefit from membership in the bloc by ensuring a compact set of labor force values, e.g.,
Once migration takes place, the optimum way to reduce α is to start with migration from the state with the largest labor force (the "top" state) to the state with the smallest one (the "bottom" state). Since migration reduce the labor force in the top state and raises it in the bottom one, the number of top and bottom states increases with M. Thus, reducing the value of α requires emigration from, and immigration to, an increasing number of states as migration proceeds. Hence, the marginal impact of migration on α declines as migration increases.
Denote the largest (smallest) post-migration labor force in the regional bloc by
Equation (8) shows that migration reduces α by -2/M , with the reduction falling with M. The next step is to determine the optimal value of M. The total benefit member states obtain from bloc formation in this case is:
is the total migration cost and c is the cost per individual migrant.
As mentioned above (footnote 10), the intra-regional South-South migration cost c is likely to be relatively small while the increase in average benefit B (associated with the migration-related decrease in α and thus in
so that migration is likely to be beneficial. Denoting the maximum value of 10 The reason the marginal impact of migration M on α is -2/M is illustrated with the following example: assume ten small states S = 1, …, 10 that are ordered by increasing size of their labor force L = 1, …, 10. In the absence of migration (M = 0), α = 9.
With one migrant (M1 = 1) moving from the top to the bottom labor-endowed state, L = 2 in states S = 1, 2, and L = 9 in states S = 9, 10, with α = 7 and dα /dM = -2/ M1 = -2. Then, for α to fall, the additional migration M2 must be equal to 2, in which case L = 3 in states S = 1, 2 and 3, and L = 8 in states S = 8, 9 and 10, with α = 5, i.e., dα /dM = -2/ M2 = 1, etc.
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Denote the optimum bloc size in the absence (presence) of an accession fee by ) ( * n n E and the optimum migration level by ) ( (5) and (6),
, and the term in the { } brackets is negative.
The impact of migration on the value of the bloc and on the region's welfare in the case of an
Migration raises V in two ways. First, the reduction in α and in regional negotiation costs raises V at the original bloc size * n . Second, the optimal adjustment of the bloc size from * n to * n further raises V.
, a value of α exists for which
(in the absence of migration) and no regional bloc is formed. In that case, if 0 * > G , the impact of migration on the value of the bloc is
migration has a greater impact in the case where no bloc is formed in the absence of migration.
The findings in this section are summarized in Proposition 2. 
Proposition 2: The impact of international migration on bloc and regional welfare is
increases with dissimilarity (α ) of the small states, their proximity (i.e., with lower migration cost c), the number of issues being negotiated, and a lower international migration cost x. The benefit from migration is greater in the case where a regional bloc is formed in the presence of migration but not in its absence. 
South-South Migration and Trade
Unilateral Transfers
Assume activities associated with regional and international negotiations, including migration, are "produced" with goods X and Y. Intra-bloc migration raises bloc size and unilateral transfers (equation (1)), and raises bloc members' total benefit by G ∆ . Homothetic Heckscher-Ohlin preferences and constant prices for the region imply constant income shares X s spent on X and
). Moreover, the fact that factor prices are given implies that production of X and Y is given as well and is independent of the size of the transfers obtained. The same holds if migrants to the North (see Section 5) send remittances home. The assumption of remittances provided in donors' exportable units Y is not only plausible but can also be observed in the case of migrants who send, or take with them on their visits home, goods that are unavailable in their country of origin or only at much higher cost.
Market Access
In this case, the larger size of the regional bloc implies that its members obtain greater access for their exports. Thus, migration and trade are complements in this case.
14 The results obtained in this section are summarized in Proposition 3. 
South-South and South-North Migration
Assume small member states first decide on bloc formation and South-South migration, after which individuals decide on South-North migration. Equilibrium South-North migration is given by equality between the heterogeneous migration cost and the North-South income gap. Under unilateral transfers, the income gap is equal to the difference between the wage rate in the North and the sum of the wage rate in the South and the per-capita benefit of bloc formation. Thus, South-North migration declines with the per-capita benefit from bloc formation.
The implications of these are provided below in Proposition 4. 13 The opposite holds for payment in X-units. Partial equilibrium analysis typically assumes money transfers are made in some convertible currency. As benefit G ∆ is spent on both goods, imports rise and exports fall, i.e., migration and exports are substitutes (and migration and imports are complements. This differs from our result because money cannot be consumed). The Heckscher-Ohlin model is a real general equilibrium model and does not include fiat money as no one would hold money in a static (or finite-period) model because it would imply a loss of current (or final-period) consumption without any future period where the money could be used to buy consumer goods or to bequeath it. 
Conclusion
This paper examined, first, the issue of regional bloc formation among small states for the purpose of obtaining greater benefits from international negotiation, with bloc formation based on regional and international negotiation costs and bargaining power rather than on the traditional trade-related arguments for regional integration. The analysis was conducted within the framework of an augmented Heckscher-Ohlin model that includes international negotiations.
Small states benefit from the creation of a regional bloc by saving on international negotiation costs and by obtaining a higher return from international negotiations, and they incur a regional negotiation cost of achieving a unified position. The findings were as follows.
First, bloc size and its welfare impact depend on the accession condition. A selective membership without accession fee leads to an inefficiently small bloc from the viewpoint of its members and of the region as a whole because the marginal accession benefit is greater than nonmember states' benefit. In the case of an accession fee, bloc size is optimal for the original bloc members and for the region as a whole.
Second, the likelihood a regional bloc is formed and its size under both accession rules increases with the level of international negotiation costs, the number of issues being negotiated, and the degree of similarity between the members of the bloc (i.e., with a decrease in regional negotiation costs). Third, with low migration costs within a region (e.g., CARICOM), South-South migration raises the average benefit obtained by members of the bloc and the region's welfare.
The likelihood this obtains increases with the degree of dissimilarity between the region's small states, their geographic proximity, the number of issues being negotiated, and with a reduction in international migration costs. How do the z outsiders respond to the invitation for some of them to join the n E -bloc?
Any member of the z-bloc that joins the n E -bloc generates a negative externality for the other zbloc members since 0 / < ∂ ∂ − z B z for E n z < . In other words, the remaining v members of the zbloc lose and the members of the n E -bloc are able to reduce the benefit provided to successive members of the z-bloc that joins their bloc. Thus, the z-bloc members have an incentive not to have anyone join the n E -bloc and they are able to pay any member so as to stop it from defecting.
Hence, no z-bloc member joins the n E -bloc and the latter's equilibrium size is E n . The analysis above holds for a number of small states z above a critical value. On the other hand, if z is below that crit ical value, members of the n E -bloc benefit from having all members of the z-bloc accede by paying them the benefit B Z .
Finally, assume n MAX > 2n E , say n MAX = λn E + z, λ > 2. Then, λ additional blocs of size n E are formed. If λ > z, the z outsiders benefit from excess-demand for accession to the λ blocs and each member joins a different bloc and obtains a benefit B E rather than the lower B Z . If z > λ, 
